Skip to content
Draft
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
name: Active Directory AS-REP Roasting Detection
id: ab5e7322-fa7c-4752-b174-121db4ea54db
version: 1
date: '2025-10-23'
author: Mahdi Hamedani Nezhad
status: production
Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

In order for this to be a production level rule we would need some logs.

Can you please provide logs for this and open a PR on https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/

Once that is done I will take care of the rest of the updates.

Copy link
Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Thanks for the review!
I’ve added the sample logs and opened the PR here: splunk/attack_data#1052

type: Correlation
data_source: []
description: The following analytic identifies potential credential access activity
targeting Active Directory (AD) user accounts through AS-REP roasting techniques.
It detects this behavior by monitoring Kerberos AS-REQ events (EventCode 4768) that
request Ticket-Granting Tickets (TGTs) without pre-authentication (PreAuthType=0).
This condition typically occurs when an account has the "Do not require Kerberos
pre-authentication" flag enabled, which adversaries can exploit to obtain encrypted
credentials for offline password cracking. This is significant for a SOC as it highlights
attempts to enumerate or harvest weakly protected user accounts, potentially exposing
valid credentials. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers
to gain unauthorized access to AD services and escalate privileges within the domain.
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 ServiceName=krbtgt PreAuthType=0
| search NOT TargetUserName="*$"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetUserName ServiceName src_ip dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `active_directory_as_rep_roasting_detection`'
how_to_implement: Splunk Enterprise Security is required to utilize this correlation.
Ensure that Windows Security Event Logs (EventCode 4768) are being ingested from
all domain controllers. Modify the count threshold as appropriate for your environment.
In testing, three or more events in a short period may indicate enumeration or roasting
behavior. Tune filters and thresholds to reduce false positives.
known_false_positives: False positives may occur in environments with legacy or service
accounts that legitimately have pre-authentication disabled. These accounts should
be reviewed and filtered as appropriate.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
- https://research.splunk.com/stories/active_directory_privilege_escalation/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$TargetUserName$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search TargetUserName = "$TargetUserName$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View related Kerberos activity for - "$src_ip$"
search: 'index=windows (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 OR EventCode=4771) src_ip="$src_ip$"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName)
as "Target Users" values(EventCode) as "Event Codes" by src_ip dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Credential Access via Kerberos
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid: []
mitre_attack_id:
- T1558.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
Loading