Harden CI workflow against pwn request attacks (release-v0.6) - #42
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- Replace pull_request_target with pull_request so fork PRs no longer run with access to secrets or a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN - Remove safe-to-test label gate; replace with explicit permissions (contents:read, checks:write on test; contents:read on deploy) - Remove unnecessary packages:write from deploy job - Pin all actions to immutable commit SHAs - Gate e2e test to push and same-repo PRs to avoid burning runner resources on untrusted fork code - Add persist-credentials:false to both checkout steps - Simplify checkout refs and fix deploy job if condition syntax Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Backport of the CI hardening from #39 to
release-v0.6.pull_request_targetwithpull_requestso fork PRs no longer run with access to secrets or a write-capableGITHUB_TOKENsafe to testlabel gate; add explicitpermissionsblocks (contents: read+checks: writeontest;contents: readondeploy)packages: writefromdeployjobpushand same-repo PRs onlypersist-credentials: falseto both checkout stepsgithub.shaand fixdeployjobifcondition syntaxRef: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/hackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation
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