🔒 [security fix] Fix Eval Injection in fish fzf preview - #3
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Properly escape $file_path using `string escape --` before passing it to `eval` in `_fzf_preview_file.fish`. This prevents arbitrary command execution when previewing files with malicious names.
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Code Review
This pull request improves the security and reliability of file and directory previews in the Fish shell by replacing manual quoting with the string escape builtin within eval calls. The review feedback suggests further hardening these calls by using the -- flag with eval to ensure that command variables starting with a hyphen are not misinterpreted as options to the eval command itself.
| if set --query fzf_preview_file_cmd | ||
| # need to escape quotes to make sure eval receives file_path as a single arg | ||
| eval "$fzf_preview_file_cmd '$file_path'" | ||
| eval $fzf_preview_file_cmd (string escape -- "$file_path") |
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While the use of string escape correctly mitigates the injection vulnerability, eval can still misinterpret the command if $fzf_preview_file_cmd starts with a hyphen (e.g., if it's set to a command named -h). Using eval -- is a more robust practice to ensure that the variable's content is treated as the command to be executed rather than an option to the eval builtin.
eval -- $fzf_preview_file_cmd (string escape -- "$file_path")
| if set --query fzf_preview_dir_cmd | ||
| # see above | ||
| eval "$fzf_preview_dir_cmd '$file_path'" | ||
| eval $fzf_preview_dir_cmd (string escape -- "$file_path") |
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Similar to the file preview command, using eval -- prevents potential misinterpretation of the command string if it begins with a hyphen, ensuring it is treated as the command to be evaluated.
eval -- $fzf_preview_dir_cmd (string escape -- "$file_path")
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🎯 What: Fixed an eval injection vulnerability in
⚠️ Risk: Arbitrary command execution if a filename contains special characters (e.g., single quotes).
_fzf_preview_file.fish.🛡️ Solution: Used
string escape --to properly escape the$file_pathbefore passing it toeval.PR created automatically by Jules for task 12480772281073399573 started by @phucisstupid