fix(crypto): prevent nonce reuse vulnerability in AEAD encryption#2
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SECURITY: Counter-based nonces reset to 0 on process restart, which causes nonce reuse with the same key - a catastrophic failure for ChaCha20-Poly1305 that enables key recovery attacks. Changes: - SecurityContext now uses fully random 96-bit nonces from CSPRNG - Deterministic nonces restricted to #[cfg(test)] builds only - frame.rs encode_with_aead() now uses secure random nonces - Added comprehensive nonce generation docs (Section 7.8.4) - Added tests for nonce uniqueness and entropy The random nonce approach has birthday bound at 2^48 messages, which is negligible risk for typical M2M sessions (<2^-49 collision prob at 16M messages).
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Summary
Fixes a critical security vulnerability where counter-based nonces reset to 0 on process restart, causing nonce reuse with the same key. For ChaCha20-Poly1305, nonce reuse enables key recovery attacks.
Changes
SecurityContextnow uses fully random 96-bit nonces from CSPRNG#[cfg(test)]builds onlyframe.rsencode_with_aead()uses secure random noncesSecurity Analysis
Before: Counter started at 0 on every process restart → same nonces reused with same key → catastrophic AEAD failure
After: Random 96-bit nonces → birthday bound at 2^48 messages → collision probability ~2^-49 at 16M messages (negligible for M2M sessions)
Testing