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πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix shell injection and unquoted variables#39

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sentinel/fix-shell-injection-16747109593899495064
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πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix shell injection and unquoted variables#39
bluPhy wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
sentinel/fix-shell-injection-16747109593899495064

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@bluPhy bluPhy commented Feb 6, 2026

🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Unquoted variables in entrypoint.sh allowed argument splitting and glob expansion.
🎯 Impact: Passwords with spaces were mishandled; wildcards could trigger unexpected file matching.
πŸ”§ Fix: Applied proper quoting, read -r, and fixed printf usage. Also fixed paths in gencert.sh.
βœ… Verification: Verified with reproduction script and syntax checks.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 16747109593899495064 started by @bluPhy

Summary by CodeRabbit

Release Notes

  • Documentation

    • New security guidance document covering shell script injection vulnerabilities and prevention best practices.
  • Bug Fixes

    • Strengthened shell script safety with improved variable quoting and argument handling.
    • Updated executable paths for VPN server components to correct system locations.

- Quote all variable expansions to prevent word splitting and globbing
- Use `read -r` to prevent backslash interpretation
- Fix `printf` usage to avoid format string injection
- Fix binary paths in `gencert.sh` to match Dockerfile installation (/usr/local/bin)

Co-authored-by: bluPhy <11618798+bluPhy@users.noreply.github.com>
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coderabbitai bot commented Feb 6, 2026

Walkthrough

This pull request addresses shell script injection risks through security documentation and code hardening. It introduces a vulnerability guide at .jules/sentinel.md, applies proper variable quoting and read flag improvements to entrypoint.sh, and updates executable paths in gencert.sh to use /usr/local/bin/ instead of /usr/bin/.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Security Documentation
.jules/sentinel.md
New guide documenting Shell Script Injection risks, focusing on unquoted variable expansion, argument splitting, glob expansion, and prevention strategies.
Script Hardening
copyables/entrypoint.sh
Applied defensive quoting around all variable expansions and filesystem checks. Updated read invocations to use -r flag. Ensured proper quoting of function arguments and command substitutions throughout user creation and VPN command handling.
Executable Path Updates
copyables/gencert.sh
Updated vpnserver and vpncmd executable paths from /usr/bin/ to /usr/local/bin/ across server start, OpenVPN enable, and certificate retrieval commands.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~12 minutes

Poem

🐰 With whiskers raised and ears alert,
I've quoted vars to prevent hurt,
From injection's sneaky, curly way,
Our scripts are safer nowβ€”hip hooray! ✨

πŸš₯ Pre-merge checks | βœ… 3
βœ… Passed checks (3 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check βœ… Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check βœ… Passed The title clearly summarizes the main change: fixing shell injection vulnerabilities through proper quoting of variables.
Docstring Coverage βœ… Passed Docstring coverage is 100.00% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%.

✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings.

✨ Finishing touches
  • πŸ“ Generate docstrings
πŸ§ͺ Generate unit tests (beta)
  • Create PR with unit tests
  • Post copyable unit tests in a comment
  • Commit unit tests in branch sentinel/fix-shell-injection-16747109593899495064

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Summary of Changes

Hello @bluPhy, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!

This pull request addresses a critical high-severity shell injection vulnerability within the entrypoint.sh script by implementing secure coding practices such as proper variable quoting and safe input reading. These changes prevent malicious argument splitting and glob expansion, which could previously lead to mishandled passwords or unexpected command execution. Additionally, it corrects binary paths in gencert.sh for consistency and introduces documentation to educate on the vulnerability and its prevention, significantly enhancing the security and robustness of the system.

Highlights

  • Shell Injection Prevention: Implemented robust shell quoting ("$VAR") in entrypoint.sh to prevent shell injection vulnerabilities arising from unquoted variables, which previously allowed argument splitting and glob expansion.
  • Secure Input Reading: Adopted read -r in entrypoint.sh to disable backslash interpretation, enhancing security when processing user input and preventing unintended command execution.
  • Format String Vulnerability Mitigation: Corrected printf usage in entrypoint.sh to printf " %s" "$1" to mitigate potential format string vulnerabilities when outputting variable content.
  • Path Correction: Updated binary paths in gencert.sh from /usr/bin to /usr/local/bin for vpnserver and vpncmd, ensuring correct execution paths.
  • Vulnerability Documentation: Added a new markdown document (.jules/sentinel.md) to detail the shell injection vulnerability, its impact, and best practices for prevention, serving as a learning resource.

🧠 New Feature in Public Preview: You can now enable Memory to help Gemini Code Assist learn from your team's feedback. This makes future code reviews more consistent and personalized to your project's style. Click here to enable Memory in your admin console.

Changelog
  • .jules/sentinel.md
    • New file added documenting a shell script injection vulnerability.
    • Details the risks of unquoted variables, specifically argument splitting and glob expansion.
    • Provides prevention guidelines: always quote variables, use read -r, and printf " %s" "$VAR".
  • copyables/entrypoint.sh
    • Variables like $CONFIG, $USERS, $PASSWORD, and $CMD are now consistently quoted (e.g., "$CONFIG") to prevent shell expansion issues.
    • read commands now use the -r option (e.g., read -r -a USER, read -r username password) to prevent backslash escapes from being interpreted.
    • printf statements for user-provided arguments are updated to printf " %s" "$1" to prevent format string vulnerabilities.
  • copyables/gencert.sh
    • Updated all occurrences of /usr/bin/vpnserver and /usr/bin/vpncmd to /usr/local/bin/vpnserver and /usr/local/bin/vpncmd respectively, ensuring correct binary execution paths.
Activity
  • This pull request was automatically generated by Jules for a task initiated by @bluPhy.
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Code Review

This pull request effectively addresses critical shell injection vulnerabilities by consistently quoting variables and using read -r in entrypoint.sh, which significantly enhances script security and updates paths in gencert.sh. While these changes prevent argument splitting and glob expansion, a regression has been introduced in the fix for processing custom VPN commands via the VPNCMD_SERVER and VPNCMD_HUB environment variables. This flaw causes only the first command in a list to be processed and fails if that command contains arguments, potentially preventing users from applying necessary security configurations.

Comment on lines +159 to 161
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_server "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"

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security-medium medium

The fix for processing VPNCMD_SERVER commands is incorrect and introduces a regression.

  1. Array Handling: CMD is an array created by read -a. In bash, "$CMD" only expands to the first element of the array ("${CMD[0]}").
  2. Argument Splitting: By quoting "$CMD", the shell passes the entire command string (including arguments) as a single argument to the vpncmd_server function. Since vpncmd expects the command and its arguments as separate parameters, this will cause commands with arguments to fail.
  3. Logic Error: The read -a command with IFS=";" splits the entire input string into the array. The while loop only executes once because read consumes the whole line. Since only the first element of the array is used, all subsequent commands in the semicolon-separated list are ignored.

This breaks the custom configuration functionality and can lead to a failure to apply important security settings.

Suggested change
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_server "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMDS; do
for cmd in "${CMDS[@]}"; do
vpncmd_server $cmd
done
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"

Comment on lines +165 to 167
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_hub "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"

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security-medium medium

Same issue as with VPNCMD_SERVER. The current implementation only executes the first command and fails if it has arguments.

Suggested change
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_hub "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMDS; do
for cmd in "${CMDS[@]}"; do
vpncmd_hub $cmd
done
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"

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Actionable comments posted: 1

πŸ€– Fix all issues with AI agents
In `@copyables/entrypoint.sh`:
- Around line 158-168: The loops reading VPNCMD_SERVER and VPNCMD_HUB currently
use read -a CMD but call vpncmd_server/vpncmd_hub with "$CMD" which expands to
only ${CMD[0]}; change each while-read block to iterate the array elements (use
"${CMD[@]}" or an inner for-loop) and call vpncmd_server or vpncmd_hub once per
element so every semicolon-separated command is executed (refer to
VPNCMD_SERVER, VPNCMD_HUB, the CMD array, and functions
vpncmd_server/vpncmd_hub).
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
copyables/gencert.sh (1)

4-4: Redirect order 2>&1 >/dev/null does not suppress stderr.

The current order redirects stderr to the original stdout (the terminal) and then redirects stdout to /dev/null. So stderr still reaches the caller. If the intent is to silence both streams, the correct order is >/dev/null 2>&1. This pre-dates your change, but since you're touching these lines anyway it's worth fixing. The same pattern also appears in entrypoint.sh (lines 62, 68, 112, 178).

Proposed fix
-/usr/local/bin/vpnserver start 2>&1 >/dev/null
+/usr/local/bin/vpnserver start >/dev/null 2>&1
-    /usr/local/bin/vpncmd localhost /SERVER /CSV /CMD OpenVpnEnable yes /PORTS:1194 2>&1 >/dev/null
+    /usr/local/bin/vpncmd localhost /SERVER /CSV /CMD OpenVpnEnable yes /PORTS:1194 >/dev/null 2>&1

Also applies to: 10-10

copyables/entrypoint.sh (2)

62-62: Same 2>&1 >/dev/null redirect-order issue as in gencert.sh.

See the comment on gencert.sh β€” 2>&1 must come after >/dev/null to actually suppress stderr. All four lines here have the same problem.

Also applies to: 68-68, 112-112, 178-178


79-79: Several variable expansions on unchanged lines are still unquoted.

Given the PR's goal of fixing unquoted variables, these are worth addressing for consistency:

  • Line 79: /PSK:${PSK} β†’ /PSK:"${PSK}"
  • Line 86: /MTU:$MTU β†’ /MTU:"$MTU"
  • Line 172: ${HPW} β†’ "${HPW}"
  • Line 176: ${SPW} β†’ "${SPW}"

Passwords and secrets with special characters would still be vulnerable to word-splitting here.

Also applies to: 86-86, 172-172, 176-176

Comment on lines +158 to 168
if [[ "$VPNCMD_SERVER" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_server "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"
fi

if [[ $VPNCMD_HUB ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -ra CMD; do
vpncmd_hub $CMD
if [[ "$VPNCMD_HUB" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_hub "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"
fi
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⚠️ Potential issue | πŸ”΄ Critical

Bug: "$CMD" only expands to the first array element β€” all commands after the first semicolon are silently dropped.

read -r -a CMD splits the input by IFS=";" into an array, but "$CMD" (without an index) is equivalent to "${CMD[0]}". This means only the first semicolon-separated command is executed; the rest are silently ignored. ShellCheck SC2128 flags this exact issue.

Compare with the USERS block (lines 141–146) which correctly uses an inner for loop to iterate all array elements. Apply the same pattern here:

Proposed fix
   if [[ "$VPNCMD_SERVER" ]]; then
     while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
-      vpncmd_server "$CMD"
+      for c in "${CMD[@]}"; do
+        vpncmd_server "$c"
+      done
     done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"
   fi
 
   if [[ "$VPNCMD_HUB" ]]; then
     while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
-      vpncmd_hub "$CMD"
+      for c in "${CMD[@]}"; do
+        vpncmd_hub "$c"
+      done
     done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"
   fi
πŸ“ Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
if [[ "$VPNCMD_SERVER" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_server "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"
fi
if [[ $VPNCMD_HUB ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -ra CMD; do
vpncmd_hub $CMD
if [[ "$VPNCMD_HUB" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
vpncmd_hub "$CMD"
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"
fi
if [[ "$VPNCMD_SERVER" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
for c in "${CMD[@]}"; do
vpncmd_server "$c"
done
done <<<"$VPNCMD_SERVER"
fi
if [[ "$VPNCMD_HUB" ]]; then
while IFS=";" read -r -a CMD; do
for c in "${CMD[@]}"; do
vpncmd_hub "$c"
done
done <<<"$VPNCMD_HUB"
fi
🧰 Tools
πŸͺ› Shellcheck (0.11.0)

[warning] 160-160: Expanding an array without an index only gives the first element.

(SC2128)


[warning] 166-166: Expanding an array without an index only gives the first element.

(SC2128)

πŸ€– Prompt for AI Agents
In `@copyables/entrypoint.sh` around lines 158 - 168, The loops reading
VPNCMD_SERVER and VPNCMD_HUB currently use read -a CMD but call
vpncmd_server/vpncmd_hub with "$CMD" which expands to only ${CMD[0]}; change
each while-read block to iterate the array elements (use "${CMD[@]}" or an inner
for-loop) and call vpncmd_server or vpncmd_hub once per element so every
semicolon-separated command is executed (refer to VPNCMD_SERVER, VPNCMD_HUB, the
CMD array, and functions vpncmd_server/vpncmd_hub).

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