WW-5621 Harden XML parsers against Entity Expansion (Billion Laughs) attacks#1642
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…attacks Modern JDKs (7u45+) already protect against this attack with a built-in 64K entity expansion limit. These changes add defense-in-depth hardening and remove unnecessary attack surface. - Remove unused parseStringAsXML feature from StringAdapter to eliminate a theoretical XML Entity Expansion vector - Deprecate setParseStringAsXML() and getParseStringAsXML() for removal - Enable SECURE_PROCESSING feature in DigesterDefinitionsReader - Add unit test verifying JDK's entity expansion limit rejects Billion Laughs payloads - Add research document with vulnerability analysis Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…attacks Backport of #1642 from Struts 7 to Struts 6. Modern JDKs (7u45+) already protect against this attack with a built-in 64K entity expansion limit. These changes add defense-in-depth hardening and remove unnecessary attack surface. - Enable FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING in DomHelper SAX parser - Enable FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING in DigesterDefinitionsReader - Remove unused parseStringAsXML feature from StringAdapter to eliminate a theoretical XML Entity Expansion vector - Deprecate setParseStringAsXML() and getParseStringAsXML() for removal - Add Billion Laughs protection tests for DomHelper and DigesterDefinitionsReader Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Fixes WW-5621
Defense-in-depth hardening of XML parsers against Entity Expansion (Billion Laughs) attacks. This is not an exploitable vulnerability — modern JDKs (7u45+) already enforce a 64K entity expansion limit, and all XML sources come from the classpath, not user input.
Changes
FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSINGinDomHelperand TilesDigesterDefinitionsReaderparseStringAsXMLfeature fromStringAdapterto eliminate theoretical attack surfacegetParseStringAsXML()/setParseStringAsXML()for future removalTests
DomHelperTest(core)TestDigesterDefinitionsReader(tiles)StringAdapterTestcovering the deprecated no-opparseStringAsXMLcontractTest plan
mvn test -DskipAssembly -pl core -Dtest=DomHelperTest— 5 tests passmvn test -DskipAssembly -pl plugins/xslt -Dtest=StringAdapterTest— 2 tests passmvn test -DskipAssembly -pl plugins/tiles -Dtest=TestDigesterDefinitionsReader— 3 tests pass🤖 Generated with Claude Code