This document outlines the security measures, audit status, and best practices for the JustFlash Protocol.

All external entry points are protected with OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard:

contract FlashLoanPool is ReentrancyGuard {
    function flashLoan(...) external nonReentrant { ... }
    function deposit(...) external nonReentrant { ... }
    function withdraw(...) external nonReentrant { ... }
}

All functions follow the CEI pattern:

function flashLoan(...) external nonReentrant {
    // CHECKS: Validate inputs
    if (amount == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
    if (!_supportedTokens[token]) revert TokenNotSupported(token);
    
    // EFFECTS: Update state
    uint256 premium = calculatePremium(amount);
    uint256 preBalance = getBalance();
    
    // INTERACTIONS: External calls last
    token.transfer(receiver, amount);
    receiver.executeOperation(...);
    token.transferFrom(receiver, address(this), amountOwed);
}

Only verified tokens are supported to prevent malicious token attacks:

mapping(address => bool) private _supportedTokens;

function whitelistToken(address token) external onlyOwner {
    _supportedTokens[token] = true;
}

Post-callback balance verification ensures repayment:

uint256 postBalance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
if (postBalance < preBalance + premium) {
    revert FlashLoanRepaymentFailed(...);
}

Admin functions are protected with Ownable:

function setFlashLoanFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner { ... }
function whitelistToken(address token) external onlyOwner { ... }
function setFeeCollector(address collector) external onlyOwner { ... }

JustFlash does not use price oracles for core functionality. Strategies using flash loans (arbitrage, liquidations) may depend on external oracles - this is the user's responsibility.

The owner can:

• Add/remove supported tokens
• Update flash loan fee (max 1%)
• Update fee collector address
• Update treasury address

Consider implementing a timelock or multi-sig for production.

Initial deployment is owner-controlled. Plan to transition to:

• Multi-signature wallet
• Governance contract
• Timelock for sensitive operations

⚠️ This protocol has NOT been professionally audited.

1. Internal Review: Completed ✅
2. External Audit #1: Pending
3. External Audit #2: Pending
4. Formal Verification: Pending
5. Bug Bounty Program: Pending

• Trail of Bits
• OpenZeppelin
• Consensys Diligence
• Certora (formal verification)

In scope:

• FlashLoanPool.sol
• FeeCollector.sol
• PoolRegistry.sol
• All interface contracts

Out of scope:

• Frontend application
• Third-party integrations
• Issues in dependencies

function executeOperation(...) external returns (bool) {
    require(msg.sender == FLASH_LOAN_POOL, "Unauthorized");
    // ...
}

using SafeERC20 for IERC20;

// Instead of
token.transfer(to, amount);

// Use
token.safeTransfer(to, amount);

require(amount > 0, "Zero amount");
require(receiver != address(0), "Zero address");
require(premium <= maxAcceptablePremium, "Premium too high");

uint256 received = dex.swap(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn);
require(received >= minAmountOut, "Slippage exceeded");

pool.flashLoan(...).send({ feeLimit: 500_000_000 }); // 500 TRX

The protocol can be paused by:

1. Delisting all tokens (prevents new flash loans)
2. Deploying upgraded contracts
3. Migrating liquidity

1. Detection: Monitor events and balances
2. Assessment: Determine impact and scope
3. Containment: Delist affected tokens
4. Remediation: Deploy fix
5. Communication: Notify users
6. Post-mortem: Document lessons learned

For security concerns, contact:

• Security Email: security@justflash.io
• GitHub Security Advisory: Submit privately on GitHub

This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a security guarantee.