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fix(secrets): stop suppressing live credentials; rewrite 11 skills - #10
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The placeholder exclusion in secret_detection.yaml declared `window: 50`
and the Exclusion struct had no such field, so the words were matched
against the credential itself. A live Stripe test-mode key is `sk_test_…`
and contains the substring "test", so every one of them was reported as a
known false positive. Implements Window, searching a span either side of
the match and deliberately cutting the match out — a window spanning it
reproduces the bug it exists to fix. Splits the word list accordingly:
placeholder values ("your-", "REPLACE_ME") still match the value, while
documentation markers ("example", "sample") match only the context.
Removes the JWT exclusion. Its prefix decoded to {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"},
the header of essentially every HS256 token, so `match_type: prefix`
suppressed real bearer tokens. Downgrades Stripe pk_live_ from high:
Stripe documents it as publishable and intends it to sit in browser
JavaScript, so at high it fired on every correct checkout page.
Adds a validator for cross-skill pointers that appear only in `## Context`.
That section reaches no packaged target, so six skills routed delegations
through text the build strips — threat-modeling did it for its entire
"who owns each control" paragraph. Matches both the backtick and the
[[wiki]] pointer forms; the second caught dynamic-verification's handoff
to security-regression-tests.
Rewrites protocol-, ssrf-, websocket-, ml-, threat-modeling,
secret-detection, secure-code-review, template-injection,
security-regression-tests, serverless- and saas-security to 2.0.0. Vendor
and version specifics move into references/ where they are allowed to
date; claims that could not be verified offline were removed rather than
replaced. Drops saas-security's vendor table, whose values disagreed with
the rules/*.json the same repo ships, and ml-security's duplicate
deserializer rules, which no code read and whose torch.load regex matched
every call including the safe one.
Corrects the claim that `secure-vibe audit` enforces a committed test: it
is a scanner and neither runs a suite nor notices a missing one.
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Three real scanner bugs
The
secret-detectionchecklist declaredwindow: 50on its placeholderexclusion and the
Exclusionstruct had no such field, so the words werematched against the credential itself. A live Stripe test-mode key is
sk_test_…and contains the substringtest, so every one of them wasreported as a known false positive.
Windowis now implemented, searching a span either side of the match andcutting the match out — a window spanning it reproduces the bug it exists to
fix, which the first version of this patch did until the new test caught it.
The word list is split accordingly: placeholder values (
your-,REPLACE_ME) still match the value; documentation markers (example,sample) match only the surrounding context.The JWT exclusion carried the base64 of
{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}withmatch_type: prefix— the header of essentially every HS256 token, so realbearer tokens were suppressed. Removed.
Stripe
pk_live_drops fromhightomedium: Stripe documents it aspublishable and intends it to sit in browser JavaScript, so at
highitfired on every correctly-written checkout page.
Upgrade note:
scan_secretsandauditnow report findings theypreviously suppressed. A repository containing an
sk_test_key or an HS256JWT may see a gate that was green turn red.
Context-only pointers reached no agent
## Contextis stripped from every packaged target, and six skills routedcross-skill delegations through it —
threat-modelingdid it for its entire"who owns each control" paragraph.
dev validatenow rejects a pointer thatappears only there, in both the backtick and
[[wiki]]forms; the secondcaught
dynamic-verification's handoff tosecurity-regression-tests.Eleven skills rewritten to 2.0.0
protocol-, ssrf-, websocket-, ml-, threat-modeling, secret-detection,
secure-code-review, template-injection, security-regression-tests,
serverless- and saas-security.
Vendor and version specifics move into
references/, where the conventionallows them to date. Claims that could not be verified offline were removed
rather than replaced —
saas-security's vendor table went entirely, becauseits values disagreed with the
rules/*.jsonthis same repo ships.ml-security's duplicate deserializer rules went too: no code read them, andthe
torch.loadregex matched every call including the safe one.Also corrects the claim that
secure-vibe auditenforces a committed test.It is a scanner; it neither runs a suite nor notices a missing one.