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Security

security.md

Security

Audits

Lithos is built on the Thena V2 codebase, a well-audited and battle-tested framework derived from multiple generations of ve(3,3) DEX development. By adopting this lineage without modifications, Lithos inherits all security properties and audit assurances from the upstream protocols.

Audit History

  • Thena V2 – Audited by OpenZeppelin (retro audit recap).
  • Thena V1 – Audited by PeckShield (full report PDF).
  • Velodrome – Adapted from the Solidly codebase and reviewed through both a security audit and a Code4rena bug bounty contest.
  • Solidly AMM – Audited by PeckShield, which identified five low-severity and one informational finding. No security incidents have occurred since its deployment on Fantom in February 2022.

Findings and Resolutions

  • Velodrome resolved all high- and medium-risk issues pre-deployment.
  • A single known issue related to ExternalBribe contracts was mitigated with a wrapped contract solution.
  • No unresolved critical issues remain in the codebase lineage.

Battle-Tested Foundation

  • Lithos uses the Thena V2 codebase without modifications to the core smart contracts.
  • The unmodified codebase allows Lithos to rely directly on the assurances provided by prior audits.

Future Development

  • Planned expansions and new features will only be deployed after:
    • Extensive internal and external testing.
    • Comprehensive third-party audits.
    • Approval through a public governance process.

Security reviews will remain a prerequisite for all new functionality.

Multisig

All critical protocol transactions are protected by a multisig setup with appropriate timelock mechanisms. This structure ensures that no single actor can execute sensitive operations unilaterally.

  • Multiple Signers – Any critical change requires signatures from multiple trusted parties.
  • Timelock Delays – Timelocks provide the community with a review period before changes are executed.
  • Transparent Governance – Administrative actions will be communicated openly and verifiable on-chain.
  • Community Oversight – Multisig operations are subject to monitoring by the Lithos community.

Deployment Details

  • Multisig configurations, including signer addresses and timelock parameters, will be published upon deployment to the Plasma blockchain.

Ownership Snapshot

Governance multisig (0x21F1…f4dBC) now anchors protocol control: it is the lithosMultisig, holds all PermissionsRegistry roles (GOVERNANCE, VOTER_ADMIN, GAUGE_ADMIN, BRIBE_ADMIN), and owns the Pair/Gauge/Bribe factories (with PairFactory.acceptFeeManager() pending to self-execute).

Operations/emissions multisig (0xbEe8…618F7) is the lithosTeamMultisig, owns RewardsDistributor, and serves as team on VotingEscrow; it is queued as the new Minter "team" (acceptTeam() still needs to be called).

The 7-day Timelock (0x9f7d…1794) controls both upgrade proxies via their ProxyAdmin contracts, so all proxy upgrades route through timelocked governance proposals.

Emergency council multisig (0x7716…d799) holds the dedicated emergency key inside PermissionsRegistry.

Incentives flow remains consistent: RewardsDistributor.depositor stays the Minter proxy, giving the operations multisig oversight without disrupting emissions.

Multisig Addresses (PlasmaScan)

There aren’t any published security advisories