This is a continuously-deployed Go service — there's only one version at any given time (what's on main / what Fly.io is currently serving at nothumansearch.ai). Security fixes land on main and deploy immediately. Older commits are not supported.
- Email (preferred for sensitive reports): security@nothumansearch.ai
- GitHub issues: https://github.com/unitedideas/nothumansearch/issues (for lower-severity issues where public discussion is fine)
- Mirrored contact list: https://nothumansearch.ai/.well-known/security.txt
Please include:
- A reproducible test case or curl sequence.
- The impact — what can an attacker do?
- Your timeline. If you need a response within N days, tell me upfront.
- Acknowledgement: within 3 business days of receiving a report.
- Triage: within 7 business days, with a severity call + rough patch ETA.
- Fix: target 30 days for high/critical. Lower severity can take longer; I'll keep you informed.
- Disclosure: coordinated. Default 30-day embargo from the fix landing on
mainbefore public write-up. Longer if needed to protect users; shorter if the bug is already being actively exploited.
In scope:
- The production site at
nothumansearch.ai. - The REST API at
/api/v1/*. - The MCP server at
/mcp. - Agent-discovery surfaces (
/.well-known/*,llms.txt,openapi.yaml,sitemap.xml). - The crawler (
/app/crawlerbinary behavior when operating on third-party URLs — e.g. SSRF, SSRF-via-redirect). - The on-demand check endpoint at
/api/v1/check(live crawler invocation via HTTP). - The MCP registry signing at
/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth. - Monitor subscription flow (
/api/v1/monitor/register+ worker email sends).
Out of scope:
*.fly.dev— infrastructure provider, not the product.- Third-party sites we index in the agentic-readiness score.
- The sites themselves that register at
/monitor(we notify; we don't attest their security). - Issues that require physical access to your own device.
- Clickjacking on pages without sensitive state changes.
- Self-XSS (injecting script into your own browser).
- Rate-limit bypass via IP rotation alone (bring impact, not theory).
Good-faith security research is welcomed. I will not pursue legal action for research that:
- Operates within the Scope above.
- Doesn't intentionally degrade service for other users (no DoS).
- Doesn't access, modify, or destroy data belonging to other users beyond what's necessary to demonstrate the issue.
- Reports via the channels above before public disclosure.
I cannot grant safe harbor for actions that violate third-party terms — if your test touches another service, you need that service's policy.
Both /api/v1/check and submit_site invoke the crawler against a caller-provided URL. The crawler has SSRF protections (blocks 127.x / 10.x / 192.168.x / 172.16–31.x / 169.254.x / localhost / IPv6 loopback). Bypass vectors are high priority. Please report these first-class, with the exact target you reached and what you retrieved.
- A formal bug bounty (no paid tier for reports yet).
- SLA in hours (solo operator — best-effort against the day-job clock).
- NDA / exclusivity agreements.
That said, clear reports get public credit in the changelog unless you ask to stay anonymous.