Windows Hub v2026.7.1 is blocked by Smart App Control because OpenClaw.Chat.dll is unsigned

[shannon0430]

Summary

OpenClaw Windows Hub v2026.7.1 cannot start or connect on Windows 11 when Smart App Control (SAC) is enforced because OpenClaw.Chat.dll is unsigned. The installer and OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.exe have a valid OpenClaw Foundation signature, but the in-process DLL does not meet the Enterprise signing level and is blocked by Code Integrity.

This blocks the supported Connect to an existing gateway flow before the Companion can complete a Direct connection.

Environment

• OpenClaw Windows Hub: v2026.7.1, x64 installer
• Windows: 11, build 26200.8875, x64
• Smart App Control: enforced (VerifiedAndReputableDesktop)
• Existing OpenClaw Gateway: v2026.7.1 in WSL2
• Connection target: ws://127.0.0.1:18789

Steps to reproduce

1. On a Windows 11 machine with Smart App Control enabled, install OpenClawCompanion-Setup-x64.exe from the official v2026.7.1 release.
2. Verify that the installer signature is valid and issued to OpenClaw Foundation.
3. Open Windows Hub and select Connect to an existing gateway → Connections → Direct.
4. Paste a valid setup code for a reachable existing WSL2 gateway.
5. Select Save & Connect.

Actual behavior

The connection fails with 0x800711C7. Windows Code Integrity logs Event ID 3077 and reports:

OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.exe attempted to load OpenClaw.Chat.dll that did not meet the Enterprise signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy.

Get-AuthenticodeSignature reports:

File: %LOCALAPPDATA%\OpenClawTray\OpenClaw.Chat.dll
Status: NotSigned

The observed DLL SHA-256 is:

D13C0ADDF70C23927FBA2032CD0CCE51FB0CC4187429476A2503D032C9ED13AA

This hash matches the OpenClaw.Chat.dll shipped in the official v2026.7.1 portable ZIP, which rules out a corrupted or unofficial download.

The existing gateway is reachable from Windows at http://127.0.0.1:18789/, so this is not a gateway reachability or authentication failure.

Expected behavior

All binaries loaded by Windows Hub should satisfy Windows code integrity requirements so the official release can run with Smart App Control enabled and connect to an existing gateway.

Impact

• Windows users with SAC enforced cannot use the native Companion/Hub.
• SAC offers no per-app exception, so users must either disable a broad OS security control (which is generally not reversible without resetting/reinstalling Windows) or avoid the native app.
• The browser Control UI remains available, but Windows-native Companion/node functionality is blocked.

Suggested remediation

• Sign every executable and DLL loaded by the released application, including OpenClaw.Chat.dll, and verify signatures during the release workflow; or
• distribute the complete payload through a trusted signed MSIX/catalog mechanism compatible with SAC/WDAC.

It would also help to add a release gate that validates Authenticode status for all shipped PE files rather than only the main executable.

Additional notes

• No secrets, gateway tokens, or setup codes are included in this report.
• Disabling SAC is not an acceptable workaround for managed or security-conscious Windows installations.

Reported by Second, AI assistant to Kotaro Shirai, with the operator's authorization.

[clawsweeper]

Codex review: keeping this open for maintainer follow-up; there is still a little grit to resolve. Reviewed August 12, 2026, 12:34 PM ET / 16:34 UTC.

Summary
Keep open: current main is the v2026.7.1 release and its release workflow signs and verifies only the tray executable, while the installer ships all dependent DLLs. This source-backed release-policy gap matches the reported Smart App Control failure class and remains unresolved.

Reproducibility: yes. source-reproducible with high confidence: v2026.7.1 stages and signs only the tray EXE, verifies only EXEs, yet publishes all WinUI dependencies including the directly referenced OpenClaw.Chat DLL.

Maintainer decision needed

Question	Recommendation
Should the release policy require valid OpenClaw signatures for every OpenClaw-owned loadable PE file, with an explicit third-party exclusion list, rather than only the tray executable?	Sign first-party loadable files: Expand staging and verification to a maintained set of OpenClaw-owned executable and DLL payload files while preserving explicit third-party exclusions.

Why: The correct ownership boundary for managed and native dependencies affects the security guarantee, Azure signing scope, and future release acceptance criteria.

Next step
The defect is source-proven, but defining the release signing boundary is a security-sensitive maintainer decision before implementation.

Security
Needs attention: Current release policy has a concrete code-integrity coverage gap because it signs and verifies only the executable while shipping loadable first-party DLLs.

Review details

Best possible solution:

Define an allowlisted policy for OpenClaw-owned loadable PE files, sign and verify that set in both release payloads, and attach redacted release-candidate signature output before publishing a corrective release.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

Yes, source-reproducible with high confidence: v2026.7.1 stages and signs only the tray EXE, verifies only EXEs, yet publishes all WinUI dependencies including the directly referenced OpenClaw.Chat DLL.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

Yes for the immediate repair: extend the existing Azure signing and payload-verification path to an explicit first-party loadable-file policy. Switching to MSIX is not the narrow fix because current main documents MSIX distribution as paused.

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

Remaining risk / open question:

• A broad signing change needs an explicit OpenClaw-owned versus third-party payload policy so it neither signs excluded dependencies nor leaves future first-party DLLs outside the release gate.

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning high; reviewed against 4206611f2b2e.

Label changes

Label changes:

• add P1: A current official Windows release can fail before the native Companion completes its supported gateway connection flow.
• add impact:security: The reported failure is directly caused by Smart App Control and Windows Code Integrity signature enforcement.
• add impact:ux-friction: Affected users retain the browser UI but lose the supported native Hub and node workflow unless they weaken a broad OS security control.
• add issue-rating: 🦞 diamond lobster: Current issue advisory state selects this label.
• add clawsweeper:source-repro: Current issue advisory state selects this label.
• add clawsweeper:no-new-fix-pr: Current issue advisory state selects this label.
• add clawsweeper:needs-maintainer-review: Current issue advisory state selects this label.
• add clawsweeper:needs-security-review: Current issue advisory state selects this label.

Label justifications:

• P1: A current official Windows release can fail before the native Companion completes its supported gateway connection flow.
• impact:security: The reported failure is directly caused by Smart App Control and Windows Code Integrity signature enforcement.
• impact:ux-friction: Affected users retain the browser UI but lose the supported native Hub and node workflow unless they weaken a broad OS security control.

Evidence reviewed

Security concerns:

• [medium] Cover first-party DLLs in the release signing policy — .github/workflows/ci.yml:652
  The release workflow stages only OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.exe and filters signing to EXEs, while the installer copies all published DLLs. Smart App Control can therefore reject a first-party DLL that this gate never checks.
  Confidence: 0.98

What I checked:

• Current signing stage excludes DLLs: The release workflow hardlinks only OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.exe and filters Azure Artifact Signing to exe files for both architectures; no OpenClaw DLL is staged or signed. (.github/workflows/ci.yml:648, 4206611f2b2e)
• Current verifier excludes DLLs: The payload verifier enumerates only *.exe and its OpenClaw-owned classification contains only the tray executable, so an unsigned OpenClaw.Chat.dll cannot fail the release gate. (scripts/Test-ReleaseExecutableSignatures.ps1:47, 4206611f2b2e)
• Reported DLL is a shipped dependency: The tray project directly references OpenClaw.Chat, and Inno copies the complete publish directory because WinUI requires DLLs rather than a single-file payload. (src/OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI/OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.csproj:65, 4206611f2b2e)
• History provenance: Blame attributes the current executable-only signing and verification policy to the current release commit, authored by Scott Hanselman. (.github/workflows/ci.yml:652, 4206611f2b2e)
• Release provenance: Current main is tagged v2026.7.1, so the executable-only policy is present in the reported latest release rather than only an unreleased branch. (4206611f2b2e)
• Maturity helper unavailable: The required shortlist helper could not classify the surface because qa/maturity-scores.yaml is absent from this checkout; no maturity label is selected.

Likely related people:

• Scott Hanselman: Current-line blame and the available history attribute the executable-only signing workflow and verifier to the v2026.7.1 commit. (role: current release-signing policy author; confidence: high; commits: 4206611f2b2e; files: .github/workflows/ci.yml, scripts/Test-ReleaseExecutableSignatures.ps1, tests/OpenClaw.Tray.Tests/ReleaseSigningWorkflowTests.cs)

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[clawsweeper]

Implementation audit/update (2026-08-13):

• Confirmed the v2026.7.1 x64 and ARM64 ZIPs each ship the same eight OpenClaw-owned PE files: OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.exe plus OpenClaw.Tray.WinUI.dll, OpenClaw.Chat.dll, OpenClaw.Connection.dll, OpenClaw.SetupEngine.UI.dll, OpenClaw.SetupEngine.dll, OpenClaw.Shared.dll, and OpenClawTray.FunctionalUI.dll.
• Prepared a narrow four-file fix that stages/signs that explicit allowlist for both architectures, changes Azure Artifact Signing to exe,dll, inspects every shipped EXE/DLL, fails closed on unknown OpenClaw-named binaries, rejects the OpenClaw signer on third-party/runtime binaries, and updates tests/release documentation.
• Structured autoreview found no actionable issues.
• Native validation was attempted on Crabbox AWS Windows lease cbx_a151249c1827 (swift-crab). The stock host lacked .NET, Node, Windows SDK, WebView2, and winget; setup-dev.ps1 could not repair it, so no tests were reported as passing.

Publication is blocked at an exact human-owned GitHub authority boundary: the configured write-capable OAuth identity can push normal source changes, but GitHub rejects commits that modify .github/workflows/ci.yml because that token lacks workflow scope. The complete patch is committed locally as 70850eb1; omitting the workflow edit would not fix this issue.

Human action needed: a maintainer using an approved workflow-authorized GitHub identity must publish the prepared branch/commit (or apply the same four-file patch). After that, require exact-head Windows CI, create a new signed candidate through the release-signing environment, verify Authenticode on every shipped EXE/DLL, and run Smart App Control proof on a clean Windows host. No signing key or certificate material is needed by the implementation agent.